Minding the mind and the “mental” in mental health care: An introduction to the philosophy of mental health and the therapeutic models.

  1. Miguel Núñez de Prado-Gordillo 1
  2. Jesús Alonso-Vega 1
  3. Ricardo de Pascual Verdú 2
  4. Gladis L. Pereira 1
  1. 1 Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
    info

    Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

    Madrid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01cby8j38

  2. 2 Universidad Europea de Madrid
    info

    Universidad Europea de Madrid

    Madrid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04dp46240

Libro:
Aproximaciones al Estudio del Comportamiento y sus Aplicaciones. Vol. III
  1. Vicente Pérez Fernández (coord.)

Editorial: UNED

ISBN: 978-84-362-7714-2

Año de publicación: 2022

Páginas: 15-80

Tipo: Capítulo de Libro

GOOGLE SCHOLAR

Resumen

Approaching the intricated and convoluted history of the mental healthdisciplines (or the psy-disciplines, as they have also been called) is definitely notan easy nor straightforward task. On the one hand, their actual history (i.e., thehistory of the actual development of mental health institutions and practices,of their darker and lighter figures, as well as of the users and survivors of suchinstitutions and practices) is a shadowy one —to say the least. Heroes andvillains merge constantly; Enlighted chain-breakers soon turn into perverseengineers of contemporary forms of social control (Foucault, 1961/1965; Szasz,1961/1974); charitable and open-minded leaders are revealed as unscrupulousabettors of monstruous intervention procedures (Ghaemi, 2010, Chapter 1;Scull & Schulkin, 2009); and cold-hearted, mindless behavior analysts arevindicated as deeply committed critical thinkers (Goddard, 2014).

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